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shem · Chapter 30

The C2's Landlord

Comes from chapter 29 · It told me its name three times

Last chapter I opened shem up from the inside, but one thing nagged at me: its command centre is a bare IP, no domain, so I couldn't follow the operator. I pulled on that IP anyway. And what turns up at the other end isn't the operator - it's his landlord: a bulletproof hosting block that swaps its name and its plates to stay out of reach, rents to half a dozen botnets at once, and throws the server away after ten days.

Chapter 29 ended on an honest note of frustration: shem talks to its C2 over a bare IP, no domain in front of it. And an IP with no domain is a dead end if you want to follow the operator: when he stands up his next server, there's no name resolving to the new address to lead you to him. The trail forward goes cold.

But the trail backward - the box he used this time - you can walk. And this particular box was reported so heavily that the public record tells the whole story: where these things get hosted, and how the hosting that shelters them is built, piece by piece, so there's no one left to complain to.

In 29 I wrote that the network was already telling the story - it just didn't know whose. This is going and asking the network about the landlord. And it turned into the same question asked four times over, climbing a floor each time: who do you hold responsible for this? Fair warning on the answer - every floor points to the one above it.

Where all this comes from Everything that follows is passive OSINT: third-party databases (RIPE, Shodan, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, abuse.ch, urlscan) and what other researchers have published. I don't touch a single machine. And I keep apart what I checked myself from what a third party says and what I'm inferring - here that line matters more than ever, because half the story is told by companies that no longer exist.

01One IP, two license plates

I started with the boring part: who owns 176.65.134.121? And the first oddity showed up right there. It depends who you ask.

RIPE, VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB agree: it belongs to Pfcloud UG, in Germany, under autonomous system AS51396. Its reverse DNS backs that up, 176.65.134.121.ptr.pfcloud.network. But Shodan, which scanned it right during the campaign, filed it under a different operator: AS215240, “Silent Connection Ltd”. Same address, two owners depending on which map you read.

It isn't one feed getting it wrong. I looked at the whole /24 (176.65.134.0/24, registered as “PFCLOUD-NET”) and Shodan sees 118 machines there, 87 tagged “Pfcloud” and 31 “Silent Connection”, sharing the same block. Among them, what you'd expect from a neighbourhood like this: OpenSSH all over the place, nginx, plus open VNC and a couple of proxies stood up with Ncat. The block was created by its holder on 1 August 2025 and is maintained by an entity called MNT-ZEXOTEK.

It took me a while to realise I wasn't looking at a misfiled record. The double plate is the product: two autonomous systems taking turns with the same addresses means that, depending on which feed whoever comes to complain happens to check, someone else is on the hook. It isn't administrative mess - it's administrative mess by design, paid for.

First floor, first answer: it depends who you ask. Which is an elegant way of not answering.

aurologic GmbH · AS30823provides its transit (who puts it on the internet)Pfcloud UG · AS51396RIPE/VT/AbuseIPDB · PTR pfcloud.network87 hosts in the /24«Silent Connection» · AS215240what Shodan sees · now “Microdex UG”31 hosts in the /24176.65.134.0/24 · «PFCLOUD-NET»created 2025-08-01 · mnt MNT-ZEXOTEK176.65.134.121shem’s C2 (just another tenant)
The C2 isn’t a lone server: it’s the bottom layer of a stack built to spread the blame around. Transit from aurologic, two ASNs taking turns on the same IP (Pfcloud and Silent Connection), a “bulletproof” /24, and, at the very bottom, the rented box.

02A company they shut down that’s still open

Who is “Silent Connection Ltd”, the IP’s second name? This is where third parties come in, and it’s the ugliest part. Spamhaus described that autonomous system as a “hotbed” of abuse (botnet command centres, phishing, brute force, spam) and - the detail that nails it - as the last link in a chain of decoy ISPs: layers of front companies stacked one in front of the other so that, when someone complains, there’s nobody there.

And there’s more: per Spamhaus, Silent Connection was forcibly dissolved (along with another one called “Dolphin 1337”), and even so its network kept operating. What I found lines up with that: AS215240 today is registered to a different company, “Microdex UG”, and no longer even announces routes. New name, recycled plate, same garage.

Second floor: the company you’d complain to is dissolved. And its network is still live.

What “bulletproof” means, in one line It’s not that the server is more secure. It’s that the landlord doesn’t take complaints: he ignores abuse reports, and when the heat builds he swaps the company or the autonomous system for another and carries on. Censys tags this operator’s hosts outright as bulletproof, and some keep it on a weekly watchlist.

03A shopping mall of botnets

shem wasn’t the only tenant, not by a long way. Researchers who watch this block week after week documented that, the same week as our campaign, the hosting was handing out several IoT families at once: a phanes.<arch> that, they note, “replaces” a morte.* from the week before, a /SBIDIOT/ directory, and ours. Every week the shop changes its sign; the premises stay the same.

And the neighbourhood closes in on itself: the IP right next door to our C2, 176.65.134.48, turns up in those same researchers’ infrastructure correlation, alongside the operator’s scanning nodes. It’s no coincidence of address: it’s the same business holding adjacent addresses. And for anyone following the blog, this isn’t the first time this corner shows up: we’ve already run into machines from the same block in earlier cases.

The conclusion stings a little: shem isn’t “the” bug on this server. It’s one more in the catalogue. shem’s operator rents; the landlord bills shem, and phanes, and morte, and whoever calls.

Third floor: the landlord isn’t shem’s. He’s everyone’s - and that’s exactly why none of them matter to him.

04Life and death of a throwaway server

The nice thing about having so many eyes on it is that you can date the server’s whole life cycle without touching it. Here’s what other people’s clocks say, raw:

the server’s life, by other people’s clocks
18 Sep        first delivery URLs recorded on the IP (abuse.ch)
                → the server comes to life
  22–24 Sep     the C2’s own attack window: 100+ SSH login attempts
                go out from the address against third-party decoys (AbuseIPDB/Cowrie)
  18–27 Sep     span of the ~370 delivery URLs seen: mostly on port 8080,
                with spikes on the bot’s high formula ports
  30 Sep        urlscan still catching requests to its 8080 (thousands of scans logged)
  late Sep      the 8080 starts returning an empty 404, Shodan stops seeing it change,
                and every delivery URL is now logged as down
                → the server empties out
  to 13 Oct     still being “reported”, but always re-sending the same 22–24 Sep window
                → residual reputation, not fresh activity

Bottom line: about ten days of life, and on to the next. For a business that treats servers as disposable, ten days is normal. What lasts isn’t the box: it’s the landlord. So the question moves again: if the landlord holds while the boxes come and go, who keeps his premises connected?

05And who connects all this to the internet?

Bulletproof hosting doesn’t live in a vacuum: it needs someone to give it transit, to pass its traffic to the rest of the network. That’s the boring question that actually stings, because whoever provides transit does tend to be a normal, locatable company.

I looked at Pfcloud’s routing neighbours, and one dominates by far: aurologic GmbH, another German operator (AS30823). It’s the one that, in practice, puts this block on the internet’s map. With the due caveat, which I’ll say before going on: I confirmed aurologic is the autonomous system’s main provider, but pinning that it’s the provider of this specific prefix needs another pass over BGP. That said, the direction of the thread is clear and it isn’t new: aurologic shows up again and again as the conduit the problematic German hosting breathes through.

And here the chain of shadows ends. Pfcloud renames itself, “Silent Connection” is dissolved, the boxes last ten days - but the one passing the traffic is a German GmbH with an address, a phone number and an abuse mailbox somebody reads. Fourth floor, and the only one in the whole stack you can actually put the question to.

06This is as far as the thread goes

And this is where the thread pulls taut and snaps, right where we already knew it would. I’ve been able to reconstruct who hosts shem, how that hosting camouflages itself and how long this server lasted. What I can’t do is make the jump to the operator’s next box.

You’ve known the reason since the first line, and here’s the proof of how walled-off the path is: VirusTotal knows of just one resolution for this IP - its own reverse DNS. Not a domain, no passive DNS to follow, no certificate coming up fresh, nothing that one day points at another address and tips you off to the move. When the operator stands up his next server (probably in this same neighbourhood, or the one next door) he’ll do it with a fresh IP and in silence, and it’ll be back to hunting him from the decoy, not following him from here.

It’s not a tidy ending, but it’s the honest one. shem’s operator is, for now, a nameless shadow. His landlord, though, has a name, a license plate (two, in fact) and even someone who gives him transit. Sometimes, when you can’t point at the one breaking in to rob the place, you can at least point at the one who rents him the safe house and asks no questions.

07Indicators (infrastructure)

TypeValue
C2 / delivery176.65.134.121 · PTR 176.65.134.121.ptr.pfcloud.network
Ports22 (OpenSSH 10.0p2 Debian) · 8080 (delivery) · 7434 (= 7332+2·51, the clue I left open in 29 - and that this Shodan record doesn’t close either)
C2 SSH keyce:cd:4c:9e:86:a2:76:40:40:88:f9:50:85:a8:21:01 (ecdsa)
Block176.65.134.0/24 “PFCLOUD-NET” · created 2025-08-01 · mnt MNT-ZEXOTEK
ASN (per source)AS51396 Pfcloud UG (RIPE/VT/AbuseIPDB) · AS215240 “Silent Connection Ltd” → now “Microdex UG” (Shodan)
TransitAS51396’s main upstream: AS30823 aurologic GmbH
Abuseabuse@pfcloud.io · net-abuse@microdex.de
Neighbourhood176.65.134.48 (correlated with the operator’s scanning infra) · co-hosted with 176.65.148.10 and 176.65.148.186 from earlier cases
IoT co-tenantsphanes.<arch> · morte.* · /SBIDIOT/ (same week, same hosting)
Delivery:8080 + ports 7332+2N · names bot/stub.<arch>(.se/.sk) and random 8-char
Active windowdelivery 18→27 Sep · attacks 22–24 Sep · server emptied late Sep
LimitC2 over bare IP, no domain → no pivot to the operator’s next server

To be continued - the operator will keep standing up boxes in this neighbourhood, and the decoy stays lit to catch the next one. The landlord, at least, we’ve already got the plate on. 🍯

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